Case Study Example: How Well Do Sanctions Against Russia Work? A Case Study

How Well Do Sanctions Against Russia Work? A Case Study

1. Introduction

1.1 Scope and objectives

This case study examines the effectiveness of economic and financial sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The objectives are to assess how sanctions have affected Russia’s macroeconomic performance, trade patterns, and political dynamics, and to identify unintended consequences that may limit their impact.

1.2 Research questions

This study is guided by three main questions: (1) What legal and institutional mechanisms underpin the sanctions against Russia? (2) How have sanctions influenced Russia’s economy, trade, and political strategy? (3) To what extent have sanctions produced unintended or counterproductive effects?

1.3 Methodology

The analysis employs a mixed-methods approach. Qualitative descriptions of sanction regimes and legal frameworks are drawn from policy reports and official press releases (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025; Szyszczak, 2025). Quantitative trade effects leverage the Global Sanctions Database and IMF trade flow data, using a structural gravity model to estimate the sanctions’ impact on Russia’s bilateral trade (Yalcin et al., 2025).

2. Background

2.1 Historical context of Russia sanctions

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Western states imposed targeted sanctions on key individuals, firms, and sectors (Szyszczak, 2025). These measures were expanded following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, marking the most extensive sanctions regime applied to Russia since the end of the Cold War (Yalcin et al., 2025).

2.2 Legal and institutional framework

Sanctions have been enacted unilaterally by the United States under Executive Orders 13662 and 14024, administered and enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025). In the EU, sanctions derive from the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the UK has adopted parallel measures in secondary legislation after Brexit (Szyszczak, 2025).

2.3 Previous sanction regimes and outcomes

The 2014 sanctions targeted Russia’s financial, energy, and defense sectors, but evasion through third-party intermediaries limited their effectiveness (Szyszczak, 2025). Russia’s GDP and disposable income trends were little changed in the initial years until the 2022 measures intensified economic disruption.

3. Case Details

3.1 Timeline of post-2014 and 2022 sanctions

From 2014 to 2021, the number of active sanctions against Russia increased modestly. In 2022, 25 new sanctions regimes raised the total to 38, and by 2023 it reached 56 regimes, reflecting a dramatic escalation (Yalcin et al., 2025).

3.2 Sanctioning actors and targeted sectors

Key sanctioning actors include the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, and others (Szyszczak, 2025). Measures have targeted Russia’s central bank, removal from SWIFT, export embargoes on aviation, energy, shipping, and financial services, and asset freezes on elites and defense-industrial entities (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025).

3.3 Graph: Sanctions timeline versus key economic indicators

Note: Data not derived from provided sources.

4. Analysis

4.1 Economic impacts on Russia (GDP, inflation, trade)

By early 2025, Russia’s GDP was estimated at 10–12% below pre-invasion trends and personal disposable income 20–25% below forecasted levels (Szyszczak, 2025). Inflation and domestic interest rates exceeded 20%, foreign-exchange reserves fell sharply, and bankruptcies rose (Szyszczak, 2025). Trade analyses suggest a roughly 25% average reduction in Russia’s exports and imports with sanctioning countries (Yalcin et al., 2025).

4.2 Political and strategic consequences

Despite economic hardship, Russia’s political leadership has maintained cohesion and accelerated a war-oriented allocation of public spending (Szyszczak, 2025). Sanctions have consolidated political power at the center and spurred efforts to replace Western energy markets with alternative buyers via a “shadow fleet” of tankers (Szyszczak, 2025).

4.3 Graph: Changes in Russia’s energy exports post-sanctions

Note: Data not derived from provided sources.

4.4 Effectiveness assessment and unintended effects

While sanctions have imposed significant economic costs, evasion and trade “deflection” via third-party states limit their reach (Szyszczak, 2025; Yalcin et al., 2025). Russia has liberalized bilateral trade with China, India, and Turkey, further mitigating sanction effects and potentially boosting its welfare (Yalcin et al., 2025). Sanctions may also diminish the long-term dominance of the U.S. dollar, as states explore alternative payment systems and digital currencies (Ziemba, 2025).

5. Conclusion

5.1 Summary of findings

Sanctions have substantially weakened Russia’s economy—reducing GDP, incomes, and trade with sanctioning states—but have not compelled regime change or an end to hostilities. Evasion and new trade partnerships have blunted their full impact.

5.2 Policy implications and recommendations

Policymakers should enhance multilateral coordination, tighten enforcement resources, and close legal loopholes exploited by intermediaries (Szyszczak, 2025). Utilizing frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine could increase pressure on Moscow and derive humanitarian benefits.

5.3 Areas for future research

Further study is needed on sanctions’ legal challenges, the role of digital and crypto payment systems in evasion, and the long-term effects on global currency and trade blocs as alternative financial infrastructures emerge (Ziemba, 2025).

References

Szyszczak, E. (2025). Sanctions effectiveness: What lessons three years into the war on Ukraine? Economics Observatory.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2025, January 15). Treasury disrupts Russia’s sanctions evasion schemes. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0508.aspx

Ziemba, R. (2025). The unintended consequences of economic sanctions. Lawfare.

Yalcin, E., Felbermayr, G., Kariem, H., Kirilakha, A., Kwon, O., Syropoulos, C., & Yotov, Y. V. (2025). On the effectiveness of the sanctions on Russia: New data and new evidence. CEPR.